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WAVE FUNCTION ONTOLOGY 
 
Abstract 
I argue that the wave function ontology for quantum mechanics is an undesirable ontology. This 
ontology holds that the fundamental space in which entities evolve is not three-dimensional, but 
instead 3N-dimensional, where N is the number of particles standardly thought to exist in three-
dimensional space. I show that the state of three-dimensional objects does not supervene on the 
state of objects in 3N-dimensional space. I also show that the only way to guarantee the existence 
of the appropriate mental states in the wave function ontology has undesirable metaphysical 
baggage: either mind/body dualism is true, or circumstances which we take to be logically 
possible turn out to be logically impossible. 
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WAVE FUNCTION ONTOLOGY 
 
“While our theory can be extended formally in a logically consistent way by introducing 
the concept of a wave in a 3N-dimensional space, it is evident that this procedure is not 
really acceptable in a physical theory...”  (Bohm 1957, 117) 
 
1. Introduction 
A central reason philosophers are interested in quantum mechanics is that quantum mechanics 
seems to tell us surprising things about the nature of the world. For example, quantum mechanics 
has been used as a premise of arguments which purport to show that the world is indeterministic, 
that the world is nonlocal, and even that there are multiple worlds. These arguments are 
contentious, but they have been much discussed in the contemporary philosophy of physics 
literature.1 
 There is another surprising claim that has been asserted to follow from quantum 
mechanics which has not been much discussed in the contemporary literature. This claim is that 
the fundamental space in which entities evolve is not three-dimensional, but instead 3N-
dimensional, where N is the total number of particles standardly thought to exist in the three-
dimensional universe. I will call proponents of this claim proponents of the wave function 
ontology. David Albert, for example, advocates this ontology: 
the space we live in, the space in which any realistic understanding of quantum 
mechanics is necessarily going to depict the history of the world as playing itself out ... is 
configuration-space. And whatever impression we have to the contrary (whatever 
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impression we have, say, of living in a three-dimensional space, or in a four-dimensional 
space-time) is somehow flatly illusory.  (Albert 1996, 277) 
Albert’s reason for espousing this ontology is, roughly, that the wave function is a fundamental 
part of quantum mechanics, and the wave function evolves in 3N-dimensional space. 
 The exact formulation of the wave function ontology depends on what version of 
quantum mechanics is under consideration. A proponent of the wave function ontology who 
believes a dynamical reduction theory such as the GRW theory2 would believe that the wave 
function field is all that exists – that is, all that exists is a 3N-dimensional space with a field 
evolving in that space, where the field value for each point in the space is given by the wave 
function. A proponent of the wave function ontology who believes in Bohm’s interpretation,3 in 
contrast, would believe that, in addition to the wave function field evolving in the 3N-
dimensional space, a universal particle also evolves in that space.  
 I will argue in this paper that the wave function ontology is an undesirable ontology for 
quantum mechanics.4 Instead of the wave function ontology, there are two other types of 
ontologies one could endorse. A proponent of a three-dimensional ontology would deny the 
existence of the wave function, and would only endorse the existence of objects evolving in 
everyday three-dimensional space. A proponent of a mixed ontology would hold that, in addition 
to the 3N-dimensional space, there also exists a three-dimensional space. (One could hold that 
both these spaces are hypersurfaces in a (3N+3)-dimensional space.)  
 
2. On the Correspondence Between Three-Dimensional Space and 3N-Dimensional Space  
Some might claim that there is no real difference between the mixed ontology and the wave 
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function ontology, since the state of three-dimensional objects supervenes on the state of the 
wave function (and perhaps other objects) in 3N-dimensional space. For example, they would 
say that “the cat is in the box” is true if and only if the objects in 3N-dimensional space are in an 
appropriate state. 
 The description of what constitutes ‘an appropriate state’ would depend on what version 
of quantum mechanics is under consideration. Proponents of the claim that there is no real 
difference between the mixed ontology and the wave function ontology would say that on 
dynamical reduction theories, “the cat is in the box” is true if and only if the wave function is 
such that the accessible mass of the cat is located within the accessible mass of the box 
(assuming that they endorse the Ghirardi et. al. 1995 interpretation of dynamical reduction 
theories).5 Also, proponents of the claim that there is no real difference between the mixed 
ontology and the wave function ontology would say that on Bohm’s interpretation, “the cat is in 
the box” is true if and only if the universal particle is in the region of 3N-dimensional space 
which corresponds to the N particles being arranged in three-dimensional space in such a way 
that the cat-particles and the box-particles are such that the cat is in the box. 
 As I will now show, the claim that the state of objects in three-dimensional space 
supervenes on the state of objects in 3N-dimensional space is incorrect. One could give a 
philosophical argument against this claim by questioning the very idea that, starting from a 
fundamental reality of objects evolving in a 3N-dimensional space, one can truly describe the 
evolution of objects in a three-dimensional space. One could argue that since there is no three-
dimensional space in fundamental reality, there is no three-dimensional space at all, and hence it 
is incorrect to talk of the state of objects in three-dimensional space supervening on the state of 
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objects in 3N-dimensional space. 
 While I am sympathetic to this sort of argument, I believe that it would quickly lead to 
deep and potentially unresolvable issues best saved for another paper. Instead, I will argue that, 
even assuming that it is possible for the state of objects in one space to supervene on the state of 
objects in another space, for the case of quantum mechanics this supervenience does not hold. 
There are many different ways that N particles could evolve in three-dimensional space which 
are all compatible with a particular evolution of objects in 3N-dimensional space. I will now give 
my basic argument for this anti-supervenience claim; I will consider important objections to this 
argument in the next two sections.  
 The reason there is no supervenience is that nowhere in the 3N-dimensional space is it 
specified which dimensions correspond to which particles. It could be that the x, y, and z 
coordinates of particle number 3 in the three-dimensional space correspond to the seventh, 
eighth, and ninth dimensions6 of the 3N-dimensional space, or it could be that they correspond to 
the ninth, eighth, and seventh dimensions, or it could be that they correspond to the 30th, 25th, 
and 240th dimensions, and so on. These different correspondences entail different ways that the N 
particles evolve, given a particular evolution of the objects in the 3N-dimensional space. Note 
that the difference between these correspondences is not just haecceitistic; relations like the 
distance between particles would be different depending on which correspondence were chosen. 
Thus, there is a many-to-one correspondence between three-dimensional spaces with N particles 
and a 3N-dimensional space; given the state of the objects in 3N-dimensional space, one cannot 
establish the state of the objects in three-dimensional space.7 
 As an example, consider Bohm’s interpretation. On the mixed ontology, there exist both a 
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three-dimensional space with N point particles and a 3N-dimensional space with a wave function 
field and a universal particle. The evolution of the universal particle represents the configuration-
space evolution of the N particles. It is not the case, however, that given just the evolution of the 
universal particle, one could determine the evolution of the N particles. Following the argument 
in the previous paragraph, it could be that the x, y, and z coordinates of particle number 3 in the 
three-dimensional space correspond to the seventh, eighth, and ninth coordinates of the universal 
particle, but it could be that they correspond to different coordinates. 
  In sum, the state of the objects in three-dimensional space does not supervene on the state 
of the objects in 3N-dimensional space. This shows the radically revisionary nature of the wave 
function ontology: our everyday claims, such as that the world has just three extended spatial 
dimensions, and that there are three-dimensional objects like boxes and cats, turn out to be false 
on the wave function ontology.  
 One could maintain, in reply to the above argument, that, for each possible 
correspondence between a three-dimensional space and the 3N-dimensional space, a three-
dimensional space supervenes on the 3N-dimensional space, with that correspondence. This 
proposal, though, entails that there are some three-dimensional spaces where the cat is in the box, 
and others where there is nothing recognizable as a cat or a box at all. Since no three-
dimensional space would be privileged over any other, everyday claims like “the cat is in the 
box” would still be false. 
 
3. The Hamiltonian Does Not Determine the Correspondence 
An argument of David Albert’s can be taken as an objection to my argument above. Albert 
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argues that the Hamiltonian of the equation of motion for the wave function determines in what 
way the objects in 3N-dimensional space represent a (hypothetical) world with multiple particles. 
He writes: 
a quantum-mechanical world with [one sort of Hamiltonian] will appear to its not-too-
closely-looking inhabitants to have two dimensions, and ... a quantum-mechanical world 
with [another sort of Hamiltonian] will appear to its not-too-closely-looking inhabitants 
(just as our own does) to have three.  (Albert 1996, 282) 
Albert’s argument for this is as follows. Suppose that the wave function ontology is true, and 
suppose that the Hamiltonian for the wave function is one which would describe a normal sort of 
interaction between N particles in a three-dimensional space. Albert writes that, given such a 
Hamiltonian, 
one particular hypothesis about the number of physical dimensions this space actually 
has, about the number of distinct material particles which are actually floating around in 
it, can be distinguished as uniquely natural and reasonable and elegant and whatever else 
you might like: the hypothesis that we are looking at a three-dimensional space, in which 
[N] distinct material particles are floating around; the hypothesis (that is) that the 
potential terms in this Hamiltonian represent an interparticle force whose intensity 
depends on the distance between the particles in question.  (Albert 1996, 280-1) 
Albert’s conclusion is that the quantum Hamiltonian determines that the world appears three-
dimensional to its inhabitants, even though such appearances are nonveridical.   
 What should we make of this argument that a world with the wave function ontology and 
a certain sort of Hamiltonian will falsely appear to its not-too-closely-looking inhabitants to have 
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three dimensions? I maintain that the argument is unconvincing. Consider objects such as a wave 
function field evolving in a 3N-dimensional space. As I have shown, there are multiple ways that 
this space can correspond to a three-dimensional space. Now, what Albert has correctly pointed 
out is that the Hamiltonian for the system could be such that one particular way that the 
universal particle corresponds to a world with multiple particles gets uniquely picked out by a 
criterion of naturalness. What makes that way uniquely natural is that, on that correspondence, 
the potential terms in the Hamiltonian represent an interparticle force that depends on distance 
between the particles, while on any other correspondence, the potential is a very unusual one, 
where the potential terms cannot be interpreted as representing any everyday force.  
 The problem with Albert’s argument can be briefly stated but is, I believe, decisive. The 
problem is that the naturalness of the correspondence does not get us anywhere. It isn’t the case 
that we can select the natural correspondence and forget about the rest; since there is no three-
dimensional space, each correspondence is equally real, or (if you prefer) equally unreal. To say 
that one correspondence is natural is to make an epistemic claim about how we judge 
correspondences. There is no ontological import to that claim.  
 Perhaps though there is some aspect of the ontology of the 3N-dimensional space which 
uniquely selects a correspondence. Such a proposal will be considered in the next section.  
 
4. Physical Facts Do Not Determine the Correspondence 
The second objection I will consider to my argument runs as follows. I have been assuming that 
there is nothing intrinsic to the 3N-dimensional space which picks out a particular 
correspondence to three-dimensional space. Albert implicitly goes along with this assumption, 
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because he suggests that one correspondence is preferred on grounds of naturalness or 
reasonableness; he does not appeal to an intrinsic fact about the world which picks out a certain 
correspondence. (If such an intrinsic fact existed, it would be possible for the fact to pick out an 
unnatural correspondence, but Albert rules out unnatural correspondences.) The second objection 
is that, contrary to Albert’s and my assumption, there is some intrinsic fact about the 3N-
dimensional space which specifies how that space corresponds to a three-dimensional space.  
 The problem with this objection is that there could not be such a fact. Since there is no 
three-dimensional space with multiple particles, there cannot be any facts of the form: “the 
seventh, eighth, and ninth dimensions of the 3N-dimensional space correspond to the x, y, and z 
coordinates of particle number 3 in the three-dimensional space.” It does not help to have a fact 
of the form: “the seventh, eighth, and ninth dimensions of the 3N-dimensional space would 
correspond to the x, y, and z coordinates of particle number 3 in three-dimensional space, were 
such a space to exist.” Since such a space does not exist, the fact has no ontological import. 
 One might attempt to appeal to the intrinsic properties (such as mass, charge, and spin) of 
the (hypothetical) N particles as represented in the 3N-dimensional space, and suggest that these 
properties establish a unique correspondence. One might also attempt to appeal to the facts about 
identical particles: quantum mechanics guarantees, for example, that the wave function is such 
that all particles which are bosons of the same type are in the same quantum state. None of this is 
enough, however, to establish a unique correspondence. In the best-case scenario, the following 
two claims will hold. (1) The intrinsic properties establish that the first, second, and third 
dimensions (say) of the 3N-dimensional space correspond to particle number 1 in the three-
dimensional space, and so on for each particle. (2) If it is established that, for example, the first, 
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second, and third dimensions of the 3N-dimensional space correspond to the x, y, and z 
coordinates of particle 1 of bosonic type ", then it will be established which dimensions of the 
3N-dimensional space correspond to which coordinates for each particle of type ". But even 
assuming this best-case scenario, the following two correspondences are still possible: in 
correspondence A, the first, second, and third dimensions of the 3N-dimensional space 
correspond to the x, y, and z coordinates of particle 1 of type ", and the fourth, fifth, and sixth 
dimensions correspond to the x, y, and z coordinates of particle 2 of type $; while in 
correspondence B, the first, second, and third dimensions correspond to the x, y, and z 
coordinates of particle 1, and the sixth, fifth, and fourth dimensions correspond to the x, y, and z 
coordinates of particle 2. These different correspondences involve real differences: distance 
relations between the particles would be different depending on which correspondence is 
selected. 
 
5. Mental States in 3N-Dimensional Space 
The objections considered above do not affect my argument, so I conclude that there is no single 
state of the objects in three-dimensional space which supervenes on the state of the objects in 
3N-dimensional space. I also maintain that this shows that the wave function ontology is 
radically revisionary, since everyday claims like “the cat is the box” turn out to be false. Is this 
enough to show that the wave function ontology is an untenable ontology for quantum 
mechanics?  
 I am willing to grant that the answer is “no”. A necessary criterion for a tenable ontology 
is that the ontology not affect the empirical predictions of the theory. One might think that I have 
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already shown that this criterion is violated by the wave function ontology, but I would disagree. 
Empirical predictions of a theory are, at their fundamental level, predictions about what 
phenomenal experiences observers would come to have.8 If the wave function ontology can leave 
unaffected the predictions made by quantum mechanics concerning phenomenal experiences of 
observers, then the wave function ontology meets this criterion for a tenable ontology. 
 Does the wave function ontology affect the predictions concerning phenomenal 
experiences of observers? On the mixed ontology, when the objects in 3N-dimensional space are 
in a certain state, a cat will be in a box in the three-dimensional space, and ideal observers will 
have the phenomenal experience of the cat being in the box. But on the wave function ontology, 
the proposition that the cat is in the box is false, so there is prima facie no reason to think that 
ideal observers will have the phenomenal experience of the cat being in the box. 
  I will now consider a proposal which can guarantee that, on the wave function ontology, 
observers have the appropriate phenomenal experiences. Instead of the proposal of the previous 
section, where a physical fact picks out a correspondence between the objects in 3N-dimensional 
space and the objects in three-dimensional space, this proposal is that there is a psychophysical 
fact which picks out a correspondence between the objects in 3N-dimensional space and mental 
states. This psychophysical fact is of the form: “the mental states which supervene on the state of 
a world where the wave function ontology is true are the same as the mental states which would 
supervene on N particles in three-dimensional space (or N particles in three-dimensional space 
and the physical objects in 3N-dimensional space), were those N particles to evolve in such a 
way that the following correspondence holds between the state of the physical objects in 3N-
dimensional space and the N particles: the x, y, and z coordinates of particle number 1 in the 
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three-dimensional space correspond to the first, second, and third dimensions of the 3N-
dimensional space; the x, y, and z coordinates of particle number 2 in the three-dimensional 
space correspond to the fourth, fifth, and sixth dimensions of the 3N-dimensional space; and so 
on”. Different psychophysical facts would have different correspondence relations.  
 This proposal has the virtue of guaranteeing the existence of the appropriate phenomenal 
experiences. The problem with this proposal is that it brings along some metaphysical baggage. 
As I will argue below, if this proposal is true, then either mind/body dualism is true, or 
circumstances which we take to be logically possible turn out to be logically impossible. The 
metaphysical baggage of this proposal is undesirable. But without this proposal, it is simply not 
clear whether the appropriate phenomenal experiences would exist given the wave function 
ontology. Thus, the wave function ontology is an undesirable ontology for quantum mechanics. 
 I will now show that, if the proposal presented above is true, then either mind/body 
dualism is true, or circumstances which we take to be logically possible turn out to be logically 
impossible. Dualism, for these purposes, will be characterized as the view that mental states do 
not logically supervene on the physical state of the world. Assume for the moment that the 
psychophysical fact which specifies the correspondence between mental states and the objects in 
the 3N-dimensional world does not logically follow from the physical facts, so that there can be 
two worlds with the same physical facts but different psychophysical facts. Since the 
psychophysical facts in the two worlds are different, it can turn out that the mental states in the 
two worlds are different. For example, it would be easy to pick the psychophysical facts such 
that mental states would exist in one world but none would exist in the other. 
 At this point, there are two options. One is to endorse the assumption that there can be 
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two physically identical worlds with different psychophysical facts, so that dualism is true. The 
other option is to reject that assumption, and retain materialism. I will first address the materialist 
option, then turn to dualism. 
 Materialism requires that mental states logically supervene on physical states, and thus 
that the psychophysical fact is logically necessary. The problem with materialism in this context 
is that it rules out as logically impossible certain circumstances that we take to be logically 
possible. To see this, first consider a world where the mixed ontology is true, and suppose that 
particles evolve in such a way that the x, y, and z coordinates of particle number 1 in the three-
dimensional space correspond to the second, third, and fourth dimensions of the 3N-dimensional 
space, and so on. Suppose further that the N particles evolve in an unusual fashion, so that no 
mental states exist in that world. Intuitively, such a world is logically possible. Now, consider a 
world like that one, except the wave function ontology is true. We take it that such a world is 
also logically possible. But suppose that the logically necessary psychophysical fact has the 
following correspondence relation: the x, y, and z coordinates of particle number 1 in the three-
dimensional space correspond to the first, second, and third dimensions of the 3N-dimensional 
space, and so on. Suppose further that it follows from this psychophysical fact that mental states 
exist in that world. Thus, on the materialist hypothesis, there is a possible world with the mixed 
ontology where mental states do not exist, but in the corresponding world with the wave function 
ontology mental states do exist. The problem here is that we take it to be logically possible for 
there to be a corresponding world with the wave function ontology where mental states do not 
exist. In fact, one of the intuitions that drives the whole project of the wave function ontology is 
that the mixed ontology is overly plentiful; it is thought that one can get rid of the three-
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dimensional space without affecting the predictions of quantum mechanics. Thus, the materialist 
option violates not only our modal intuitions, but also an intuition which drives the whole project 
of motivating the wave function ontology over the mixed ontology.  
 It is worth discussing two other ways that materialism could be true, besides the way I 
have considered so far. (1) Instead of there being one particular psychophysical fact which is 
true, it could be that all possible psychophysical facts are true. That is, it could be that for each 
possible correspondence relation between the three-dimensional space and the 3N-dimensional 
space, the mental states which exist according to the psychophysical fact with that 
correspondence relation actually do exist.  The problem with this proposal is the same as before: 
circumstances which we take to be logically possible turn out to be logically impossible. As 
before, there is a possible world with the mixed ontology where mental states do not exist, but in 
the corresponding world with the wave function ontology mental states do exist. The only 
difference is that, in the world with the wave function ontology, more mental states may exist 
than was previously thought. (2) Instead of having the psychophysical fact start with “the mental 
states which supervene on the state of a world where the wave function ontology is true...”, it 
could start with “the mental states which supervene on the state of physical objects in 3N-
dimensional space...”. According to this revised psychophysical fact, in the previously discussed 
world where the mixed ontology is true and the N particles evolve in an unusual fashion, mental 
states exist in that world, because they supervene on the state of physical objects in 3N-
dimensional space. Again, our modal intuitions are violated: intuitively we do not expect such a 
world to have mental states, and yet the materialist option entails that mental states necessarily 
exist in that world. 
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 I will now turn to the dualist option for accounting for the existence of mental states in 
the wave function ontology. This option entails that there can exist two worlds with the same 
physical facts but different psychophysical facts. How bad is it for the proponent of the wave 
function ontology to embrace dualism? David Chalmers (1996, Chapter 4) argues that the sort of 
dualism where the physical world is causally closed, and consciousness naturally supervenes on 
the physical, but does not logically supervene, is compatible with a scientific worldview. This 
sort of dualism – naturalistic dualism – is the dualism which the proponent of this version of the 
wave function ontology would be required to embrace. Naturalistic dualism differs from 
interactionist dualism, where the physical world is not causally closed, and mental states have a 
causal influence on the physical world. Compared to interactionist dualism, it does seem that 
naturalistic dualism does not violate any fundamental precepts of physics. Nevertheless, I believe 
that one would be hard-pressed to defend an ontology for quantum mechanics which entails 
dualism.  
 There is a widely accepted attitude among contemporary researchers in foundations of 
quantum mechanics that one should do ‘quantum mechanics without observers’. The core idea is 
that one should be able to fully describe the evolution of a quantum-mechanical system without 
making essential reference to acts of measurements by observers on the system. More generally 
the idea is that quantum mechanics should not have to say special things about the nature of 
observers; observers should evolve according to the same dynamical equations of motion as 
inanimate systems. An ontology which entails mind-body dualism comes into conflict with this 
desideratum, however. On such an ontology, in addition to the physical state evolving in 
accordance with physical laws, something additional must be specified in order to account for 
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the existence of conscious observers. Specifically, psychophysical facts must be postulated in 
order to determine how mental states evolve given the evolution of the physical state. Thus, 
dualism is a step away from the ideal of doing quantum mechanics without observers, and that is 
a mark against it. 
 In conclusion, the wave function ontology can guarantee the existence of the appropriate 
mental states, but only at the cost of holding either that mind/body dualism is true, or that some 
circumstances which we take to be logically possible turn out to be logically impossible. 
Otherwise, it is simply not clear whether mental states could exist given the wave function 
ontology. Further, everyday claims like “the cat is in the box” come out false on the wave 
function ontology. Because of all this, the wave function ontology is an undesirable ontology for 
quantum mechanics. 
  18 
Acknowledgments 
I thank Frank Arntzenius, Gordon Belot, Brian Kierland, Bas van Fraassen, and Jonathan Vogel 
for helpful discussions. I also thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments.  
References 
 
Albert, D. Z: 1996, ‘Elementary Quantum Metaphysics’, in J. Cushing, A. Fine, and S. Goldstein 
(eds), Bohmian Mechanics and Quantum Theory: An Appraisal, Kluwer, pp. 277-284. 
 
Bassi, A., and G. C. Ghirardi: 1999, ‘More About Dynamical Reduction and the Enumeration 
Principle’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50, 719-734.  
    
Bell, J. S.:1987, ‘Are there Quantum Jumps?’, in J. S. Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in 
Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge, pp. 201-212. 
 
Bohm, D. (1952), “A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of Hidden 
Variables, I and II” in J. A. Wheeler and W. H. Zurek (eds.), Quantum Theory and 
Measurement, Princeton, 1983.  
 
Bohm, D. (1957), Causality and Chance in Modern Physics, Routledge. 
 
Chalmers, D. (1996), The Conscious Mind, Oxford. 
Ghirardi, G. C., R. Grassi, and F. Benatti (1995), “Describing the Macroscopic World: Closing 
  21 
the Circle within the Dynamical Reduction Program”, Foundations of Physics 25: 5-38. 
 
Ghirardi, G. C., A. Rimini, and T. Weber (1986), “Unified Dynamics for Microscopic and 
Macroscopic Systems”, Physical Review D 34: 470-491. 
 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1. One interesting aspect of these arguments is that non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the 
theory of quantum mechanics at issue, is often taken to be true, or at least potentially true. But it 
is well-known that quantum mechanics assumes a spacetime structure incompatible with 
relativity theory, and there is strong evidence for relativity theory. It is worth discussing whether 
there are good reasons to evaluate the potential ontologies for a theory which is known to be 
false, but I will not enter into that discussion in this paper.  
 
2. According to the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory (Ghirardi et. al., 1986), the wave function 
evolves in accordance with Schrödinger’s equation (the standard dynamical equation for 
quantum mechanics), except when a collapse occurs on a particle. When a collapse happens on 
particle n, the wave function R changes to (following the notation of Bell 1987, 202-3): 
 R' (t, r1, ..., rN)  =  j(x – rn) R(t, r1, ..., rN) / Rn(x). 
The jump factor j is a normalized Gaussian, and Rn is a renormalization factor. The value x, 
representing the center of the collapsing Gaussian, is randomly chosen with probability 
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distribution proportional to |R|2. For each particle, a collapse randomly happens at a rate of 1/J, 
where J is a new fundamental constant, taken to be 1015 seconds.  
 
3. According to Bohm’s (1952) interpretation, the wave function R(t, x1, ..., xN) always evolves 
in accordance with Schrödinger’s equation. On one version of Bohm’s interpretation, it is 
described as postulating N point particles evolving in three-dimensional space. On this version, 
each particle always has a definite position r(t). The position of a particle k evolves in 
accordance with the velocity equation: 
 drk/dt  =  LkS(t, r1, ..., rN)/mk . 
The S function comes from the following decomposition of the wave function: 
 R(t, x1, ..., xN)  =  R(t, x1, ..., xN) exp[iS(t, x1, ..., xN)/S] . 
Alternatively, Bohm’s interpretation can be described as postulating one universal particle 
evolving in 3N-dimensional space; this particle gives the configuration-space representation of 
the positions of the N particles in three-dimensional space. 
 
4. My arguments can also be taken to show that the analogous ontology for classical mechanics – 
that of a universal particle evolving in a 3N-dimensional space, and no three-dimensional space – 
is an undesirable ontology. The reason I focus on quantum mechanics is two-fold. First, the 3N-
dimensional ontology is not considered to be a live option for the correct ontology for classical 
mechanics. In contrast, Albert has trenchantly defended the wave function ontology for quantum 
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mechanics in print, John Bell (according to Albert) is another proponent, and I have heard it 
advocated in discussion with other philosophers (mostly promulgators of Bohm’s interpretation). 
Second, there is prima facie a good reason to believe in the wave function ontology for quantum 
mechanics: the wave function is a fundamental part of quantum mechanics, and the wave 
function of the universe cannot be represented as evolving in three-dimensional space.  
 
5. According to Ghirardi et. al. 1995, the mass distribution Mi is defined in terms of the wave 
function by 
 Mi = +Q | Mi | Q,, 
where it is assumed for simplicity that three-dimensional space is divided into discrete cells i, 
and where Mi is the mass operator for cell i. This mass is “accessible” (following the terminology 
of Bassi and Ghirardi 1999) just in case Ri / Vi/Mi2 n 1, where the variance Vi is defined as 
 Vi  = +Q | (Mi – +Q|Mi|Q,)2 | Q,. 
 
6. Here and elsewhere, the word “respectively” is implicit. 
 
7. In fact, given the evolution of objects in a 3N-dimensional space, it is not determined whether 
that represents the evolution of N hypothetical particles in a three-dimensional space, or 3N/2 
hypothetical particles in a two-dimensional space (assuming 3N is even), and so on. 
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8. The predictions about phenomenal experiences would be made by the physical theory in 
conjunction with ancillary hypotheses about how phenomenal experiences are related to physical 
states.  
 
 
